The Department of Special Investigation's decision to prosecute six police officers allegedly responsible for the death of a teenager in Roi Et looks set to trigger a wave of complaints against the Thaksin Shinawatra administration's war on drugs five years ago.
The DSI is also stepping into a fresh investigation of the killing of 21 young people in Kalasin, which many believe were extra-judicial executions.
It has taken more than five years for the DSI to wrap up its investigation into the death of 17-year-old Kiattisak Thitboonkrong, who was found hanged from the ceiling of a hut in Roi Et's Chang Han district in July 2004.
After collecting evidence and questioning more than 100 witnesses, the DSI has decided to press charges of premeditated murder and concealing the truth against three commissioned and three non-commissioned officers attached to Muang Kalasin police station.
Three police senior sergeants-major - Angkan Khammoonna, Sudthinant Nonthoeng and Pannasilp Uppanant - surrendered on May 20.
They denied all the charges filed against them and were released on bail by the Criminal Court.
The three commissioned officers are a colonel and two lieutenant colonels. Their names have not been disclosed, but they will turn themselves in to face charges in early June.
Pol Col Piyawat Kingkate, head of the DSI's special criminal cases, said Kiattisak's murder was a clear human rights violation by state officials.
According to Pol Col Piyawat, the Chang Han police station's report to the National Anti-Corruption Commission argued that the case involved abuse of authority.
The DSI contested the findings and asked the NACC to refer the case to the agency for investigation.
"It is not about abuse of authority. It is a criminal offence and the suspects are liable to severe punishment," Pol Col Piyawat said.
The officer said there were several loose ends in Kiattisak's death, not to mention an autopsy report which showed he was beaten unconscious before he was found hanged.
The teenager, arrested on theft and drugs charges, had been bailed out by a person who was not his relative and he never returned home.
He was found dead in Chang Han district, about 100km from his home in Kalasin province.
Pol Col Piyawat said the DSI would look into the mysterious deaths of other teenagers in Kalasin after the Kiattisak case goes on trial.
At least 21 teenagers who were arrested on drugs and theft charges died suspiciously at the height of the Thaksin government's war on drugs from 2003 to 2005.
Kalasin was the first province to be declared drugs-free amid widespread suspicion that the teenagers were victims of extra-judicial executions.
"The families of eight victims have lodged complaints with the DSI. Even though we have not treated this as a special case, we can base the investigation on Kiattisak's case," said Pol Col Piyawat.
He said it was unusual that all 21 teenagers were found dead after they had been bailed out and local police had not arrested any suspects.
Somchai Homlaor, president of the Campaign for Human Rights, yesterday hailed the breakthrough in the Kiattisak case, saying it should encourage the families of victims of the war on drugs to come forward and demand justice.
Of the more than 2,500 deaths of people who were killed during the nationwide drugs suppression campaign, only a few cases were properly investigated, critics say.
State authorities claimed most of the killings were carried out by major drug dealers to silence small dealers.
Families said police pursued a campaign of street justice which trampled on people's rights.
Mr Somchai said that of 2,500 cases of suspected foul play, relatives of 26 victims had lodged complaints with the National Human Rights Commission, which investigated and found they were victims of extra-judicial killings.
The ‘war on drugs’[1] marked the beginning of Thaksin’s exertion of centralised power over the provinces and was fundamental to consolidation of rule. I will argue that the ‘war’ had a dual purpose: it aimed to destroy the trade in methamphetamine and intimidate and remove Thaksin’s political rivals. Accordingly, illegal drugs were not simply a smokescreen for an ulterior, politicised motive, but formed both a raison d’être and a legitimating framework within which Thaksin could execute the neutralisation of opposition and achieve predominant control of Thailand’s political space.
The war on drugs formed a critical part of Thaksin’s populist policy-making and agenda for constructing political hegemony. The premier effectively constructed narcotics as the principal ‘threat’ to national stability in order to legitimise an authoritarian campaign aimed at consolidating his power base. In a policy speech on 14 January 2003, Thaksin declared that narcotics were “destroying the security of the country,” and were the nation’s paramount security threat.[2] Thaksin described drug dealers as “ruthless” and stated that the suppression of dealers should be “equally ruthless.”[3] These remarks were echoed by Interior Minister Wan Muhammed Nor Matha, who established his tough approach to the issue via a bellicose warning: “Tell them [drug dealers] to stop selling drugs and leave the communities for good or they will be put behind bars or even vanish without a trace… Who cares? They are destroying our country.”[4] This message and other hard-line rhetoric emanating from Thai Rak Thai ministers gave the police carte blanche for the extra-judicial elimination of suspected drug dealers, a process administered with brutal effect. Moreover, Thaksin made it clear that the campaign would also target bureaucrats, district governors and politicians: “If politicians are involved, arrest them; deal with them severely, whatever party, whatever name.”[5] As a ‘war’ fought in the national interest, the drugs campaign fulfilled Thaksin’s populist political agenda whilst providing a framework for challenging corrupt functionaries, removing opposition and strengthening internal party dynamics. The climate of intimidation which pervaded the campaign allowed for the rapid mobilisation of pro-Thaksin apparatchiks into provincial administration, replacing officials resistant to TRT coercion. Furthermore, the premier established that the ‘war’ would be ruthlessly prosecuted, heralding a new mode of authoritarian governance under Thaksin.
Authoritarianism and a disregard for the judicial process were hallmarks of the violent anti-drugs campaign. The police were the instrument of Thaksin’s power, incentivised by a managerial promise of financial bonuses and promotions for quantity of arrests. In May 2003, the Royal Thai Police (RTP) announced that 2,275 people had been killed as a result of the campaign.[6] The RTP disclosed that of these 2,275, only 51 had been shot by police in self-defence, the rest, it was argued, were killed by rival drug dealers and criminal gangs.[7] The majority of those killed were bottom-level dealers, many were not involved with drugs distribution, but were the victims of circumstance, killed opportunistically while the war legitimised a culture of assassination and score-settling. The killings of the drugs war became known as kha tad ton, (‘kill to cut out and remove’). [8]
The severity and method of the war against drugs had historical precedent in the campaign against communist insurgents during the Cold War, and scholars noted parallels between Thaksin’s governance and the authoritarian leaders of Thailand’s recent past. McCargo and Ukrist (2005) suggested that Thaksin’s drugs war emulated Sarit Thanarat’s modes of operation, particularly due to the extra-judicial killings of so-called ‘threats to the state’.[9] The suppression of communists and sympathisers in the Thai provinces during the Cold War was orchestrated by General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and General Thammarak Issarangkua. Under Thaksin, Chavalit was deputy prime minister and chair of the newly established National Command Centre for Combating Narcotic Drugs (NCCB).[10] Thammarak was TRT’s minister of defence and had overseen the party’s successful election campaign in the poverty-stricken Northeast (Isaan).[11] Thus, those involved in the execution of communists and sympathisers in Thailand’s hinterlands were key figures in a new campaign of violence by the state, also justified in terms of national security and aimed principally at political opponents.
The war on drugs aimed to exert centralised control over peripheral areas that were weakly controlled by state apparatus and resistant to Bangkok’s jurisdiction. The drugs issue was inextricably linked to the complex socio-economic and political conditions of the border regions and Thaksin attempted to tackle the source of the drugs problem and implement increased state control of loosely administered areas. Methamphetamine (yaa baa)[12] was produced mainly in Burma’s Shan States by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which has senior level cooperation with Burma’s ruling military junta.[13] Both Chavalit and Thaksin visited Rangoon in February 2003 as part of increasingly cooperative moves towards Burma’s rulers, but ultimately TRT were frustrated by their inability to affect the Wa, which Burma’s junta claimed was “beyond its control.”[14] This inability was reflected strongly in the continuing growth of Mong Yawn, a town believed to be the epicentre of yaa baa production in the Shan States.[15] The drugs issue was thus infused with the complexities of Burma’s ethnic relations and the intricacies of cross-border security. The border regions remained the focus of the campaign and Thaksin stated in a policy speech that border province officials who were being negligent in tackling the drugs problem would be carefully scrutinised (truadtra).[16] Moreover, Thaksin claimed that the southern border provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat harboured a cohesive network of criminal drug gangs and officials should be particularly ‘strict’ (guadkan) in the suppression of narcotics in those provinces.[17] The war on drugs thus represented the attempted subjugation of the intractable periphery by Thaksin as part of broader efforts to neutralise opponents in the countryside and centralise political power.
Thaksin’s drugs war had more than drug manufacturers and dealers in its cross hairs. The campaign was also principally designed to exert Thaksin’s authority by challenging provincial officials and removing opponents within a context of fear and intimidation. The premier achieved this objective by targeting bureaucrats as part of the war on drugs. Officials who demonstrated incompetence or lack of support for Thaksin’s agenda were held accountable, removed from their positions and replaced with TRT apparatchiks. The campaign thus had a significant impact on the powerful bureaucratic elite resisting Thaksin’s hegemonic ambitions in the provinces and the targeting of recreant functionaries revealed the salient political objectives behind the war on drugs. In February 2003, a BBC report stated that Thaksin was targeting government officials involved in drugs trafficking: “Thaksin said the suspects included police and army officers, education and health ministry officials, village leaders and local administrators.”[18] The report was confirmed by a government statement which linked 928 officials to the drug trade.[19] Similar reports surfaced in the Far Eastern Economic Review which claimed more than 720 functionaries had been placed under investigation for alleged involvement in the drugs trade.[20] Pasuk and Baker, writing in the New York Times, also noted the prevalence of government officials in the illegal drugs trade:
So many officials are involved in the trade that the government a few years ago made a television commercial intended to shame them. Enough politicians are involved in organized crime groups that the prime minister publicly warned them last month to quit.[21]
Thaksin claimed that 1,200 officials were removed from office within the first three months of the campaign demonstrating the dramatic impact the war had on the rural bureaucracy.[22] The severity of the campaign’s methods ensured many functionaries left their posts due to intimidation, as TRT empowered itself through a campaign of violence and installed loyalists throughout the provincial body politic.
The targeting of political rivals was achieved through the creation of ‘blacklists’. The responsibility for compiling the lists was structured hierarchically, with village headmen (phuyaibaan) relying on informants and police for information before submitting names to the sub-district chief (kamnan).[23] At the top of the hierarchy was Interior Minister Wan Muhammed, who received a list of 329,000 ‘suspects’.[24] Provincial officials were ordered to ‘clear’ 25 per cent of the blacklisted names in the first month, 50 per cent in the second month and 75 per cent in the third month. Those who failed to reach these targets were deemed either incompetent, or under the influence of major traders and removed from their positions.[25] Wan Muhammed personally threatened officials who could not produce satisfactory results, referring to Siamese battles of independence as a stirring rhetorical device: “In our war on drugs, the district chiefs are the knights and the provincial governors the commanders. If the knights see the enemies but do not shoot them, they can be beheaded by their commanders.”[26] This threat bore fruition in the widespread dismantling of bureaucratic elements resistant to TRT coercion and the establishment of increased state control at the village level. An interview with a Chiang Rai Sub-District Chief (kamnan) revealed that as part of Thaksin’s war on drugs plain-clothed security guards were deployed in villages to monitor suspicious activity. The kamnan described the use of these surveillance personnel as one of the principal successes of Thaksin’s drugs war and they have remained operational under subsequent administrations.[27] This policy indicates that the war on drugs provided a legitimating framework for the establishment of enhanced state mechanisms which increased centralised control over the provinces.
Blacklists were open to manipulation, and names included on the lists did not necessarily construe involvement in drugs, the lists were also used to prosecute personal vendettas and settle business and political disputes.[28] Ilchman (2003) discusses this dimension of the campaign in her analysis: “The very nature of the campaign left the door wide open for those compiling the blacklists to use them to settle personal grudges or deal with business or political opponents.”[29] Ilchman’s statement was confirmed in an interview with a police officer in Chiang Rai province who noted that: “The drugs war provided opportunity for dealers to kill each other to avoid repaying debts or to remove competition in business.”[30] Blacklists thus provided the mechanism for elimination of business and political competition throughout the war on drugs and were utilised for this purpose at each level of the informant hierarchy.
The war’s conceptualisation as a campaign in the national interest and its broad popular support allowed Thaksin to label critics as unpatriotic (khon mai rak chart). Many critics who challenged Thaksin’s drugs policy were constructed as dangerous conspirators with personal links to the illegal drug trade. [31] This trend was discussed by MP Surin Pitsuwan writing in The Nation: “The Prime Minister… [lambasts] any doubter or critic of his tactics as unpatriotic and a government party spokesman claims that drug dealers are colluding with the opposition to bring down the government.”[32] A prominent critic of the war was Pradit Charoenthaithawee, a Thai human rights commissioner who criticised the methods of the campaign at the UN. Thaksin described Pradit as a “whistle blower”, whose actions were “ugly” and “sickening” and the premier threatened to have Pradit impeached.[33] This governmental intimidation of opponents extended to the village level, where local critics were constructed as enemies of the nation and of TRT.[34] In this context, opponents of Thaksin’s policy were also considered ‘threats to the state’ and their critical views, as well as their ability to challenge the government was routinely undermined.
Thaksin also utilised the context of the campaign against narcotics to mobilise pro-TRT elites into key political positions. This strategy formed part of the broader process of ‘Thaksinization’ of state institutions and the wider body politic. The war on drugs was at the forefront of TRT policy during Thaksin’s political restructuring and individuals known for both loyalties to the premier and a hard-line approach to politics soon found themselves within Thaksin’s inner-circle and at the frontline of TRT’s political agendas. Thus, the campaign against drugs provided justification for the promotion of authoritarian figures, whilst simultaneously consolidating the upper-echelons of TRT with pro-Thaksin elites. Often, these elites were friends, former colleagues and relatives of Thaksin. General Trairong Indharathat, a former class-mate of Thaksin’s and a figure with numerous business interests and political influence in Bangkok, was appointed as a personal security adviser to Thaksin before he assisted in the campaign against ‘dark influences’. Trairong was subsequently promoted to Chief of the Office of the Permanent Secretary of Defence.[35] Another key TRT figure involved in the war on drugs was the aforementioned General Thammarak, a political ally of Chavalit with strong political connections in Buriram province and the wider Northeast. McCargo and Ukrist (2005) draw attention to Thammarak’s significant role in Thaksin’s anti-drugs war in their analysis:
Thammarak was a major channel through which Thaksin acquired inside information about issues relating to narcotics and dark influences. Based on this information Thaksin was able to deploy his close friends in the police to take the appropriate action.[36]
One of these ‘close friends’, Police Major General Surasit Sangkapong, was transferred to the position of Commissioner of the Crime Suppression Division.[37] Surasit played a key role in the war on drugs, as a director of the police operation against drugs suspects and also in the war on ‘dark influences’.[38]
The campaign against illegal narcotics also aimed to weaken the influence of provincial ‘bosses’ and politicians by undermining their financial base. Glassman (2005) contends that the entire anti-narcotics campaign was based around this objective:
The stated purpose [of the drugs war] was to eliminate Thailand’s methamphetamine and opium industries, but few observers believe this a credible goal… it would seem the actual goal of the campaign was to weaken the financial base of… the provincial “political bosses”.[39]
The drugs war provided a suitable mechanism and legitimating context in which this policy could be implemented and it became a highly successful means of neutralising Thaksin’s political opposition. The Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) became the primary utility for investigating blacklisted suspects, invoking the Anti-Money Laundering Act to seize the assets of suspected traders, if that individual failed to prove they had obtained their assets through honest means. In February 2003, AMLO seized Bt250 million worth of assets from suspected dealers, including 327 plots of land.[40] Many local politicians and officials were targeted through AMLO, including Suphan Buri Provincial Administrative Organisation Chairman Sakda Jala,[41] former Democrat Party MP, Pracha Phopipit, former Public Health Minister Rakkiat Sukthana and Lampang Provincial Councillor Phanom Sap-anek, an independent politician.[42]
[1] songkhram tortaan yaaseptid.
[2] Speech of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra on the Policy for Prevention and Suppression of Drugs, Suan Dusit Ratchapat Institute, 14 January 2003. (Thai). http://www.thaigov.go.th/mobile/submore.asp?pageid=467&directory=1995&contents=4029&pageno=28&no=166
[3] Ibid.
[4] Bangkok Post, 25 January 2003.
[5] Speech of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra on the Policy for Prevention and Suppression of Drugs, Suan Dusit Ratchapat Institute, 14 January 2003. (Thai). http://www.thaigov.go.th/mobile/submore.asp?pageid=467&directory=1995&contents=4029&pageno=28&no=166
[6] Human Rights Watch Report, “Not Enough Graves: The War on Drugs, HIV/AIDS, and Violations of Human Rights” 16.8 (2004): 8. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/thailand0704/index.htm
[7] Ibid. 8.
[8] A full discussion of the human rights abuses and murders committed during the war on drugs is beyond the scope of this paper. A 2004 report by Human Rights Watch deals extensively with these issues and is available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/thailand0704/index.htm
[9] Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, “The Thaksinisation of Thailand” (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2005): 56. Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat governed Thailand from 1958-1963 and was heavily funded by the US as an anti-communist ally during the Second Indochina War.
[10] In January 2003, Thaksin issued Prime Minister’s Order No. 29/2546 on the Fight to Overcome Narcotic Drugs. The Order led to the establishment of the NCCB under the chairmanship of the Deputy Prime Minister General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. See Royal Thai Embassy Fact Sheet on the Royal Thai Government’s Anti-Narcotic Drugs Policy. http://www.thaiembdc.org/socials/drugpolicy2003.html
[11] Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, “Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand” (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2004): 163.
[12] ‘crazy medicine’.
[13] In October 1999, Khin Nyunt, then First Secretary of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), met with UWSA Southern Commander Wei Hseuh-Kang, a notorious heroin king-pin wanted by the US government, to discuss military cooperation. See Tom Fawthrop, “Wa Drug Lords Dodge US Legal Action,” The Irrawaddy, April 2005. http://www.irrawaddy.org/print_article.php?art_id=4585 See also, US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Narcotics Rewards Program. http://www.state.gov/p/inl/narc/rewards/39404.htm
[14] BBC News Online, 11 March 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1214621.stm
[15] Ibid. See also, Shan Herald Agency for News, April 2002. http://www.shanland.org/resources/bookspub/humanrights/wa/mong_hsat_township.htm
[16] Speech of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra on the Path to Victory in the War on Drugs, Suan Dusit Ratchapat Institute, 18 November 2003. Transcript available on Chiang Rai Voice radio station website: http://www.chiangraivoice.com/forum/index.php?topic=524.msg904#msg904 (Thai).
[17] Speech of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Government House, Bangkok, 5 October 2005. (Thai). http://www.thaigov.go.th/mobile/submore.asp?pageid=467&directory=2216&contents=4767&pageno=18&no=106
[18] BBC News Online, 18 February 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2774983.stm
[19] Bangkok Post, 26 February 2003.
[20] Rodney Tasker, “War on Drugs,” Far Eastern Economic Review 166.8, 27 February 2003.
[21] New York Times, 24 May 2003.
[22] The Nation, 3 May 2003.
[23] In a 2004 speech, Thaksin described kamnans as the “eyes and ears of the country.” Speech of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Miracle Grand Convention Hotel, Bangkok, 28 January 2004. (Thai). http://www.thaigov.go.th/mobile/submore.asp?pageid=467&directory=1994&contents=3434&pageno=24&no=143. According to a kamnan from Chiang Rai province, “ballot boxes” were provided for villagers to provide information on drugs suspects. This worked in tandem with the ‘1-2-3-4’ boxes installed by the police. Interview, Sub-District Chief (anonymity requested) Amphur Mae Jan, Chiang Rai, 10 August 2008. (Thai).
[24] Bangkok Post, 11 December 2003.
[25] Mathew W. Wheeler, “From Market Place to Battlefield: Counting the Cost of Thailand’s Drug War” (2004): 4. http://www.icwa.org/ArticlesMap.asp?r=14
[26] Bangkok Post, 25 January 2003.
[27] Interview, Sub-District Chief (anonymity requested) Amphur Mae Jan, Chiang Rai, 10 August 2008. (Thai).
[28] The police provided a ‘post box’, known as the ‘1-2-3-4’ box, for the public to anonymously deposit the names and addresses of those they suspected of dealing illegal drugs. See Mathew W. Wheeler, “From Market Place to Battlefield: Counting the Cost of Thailand’s Drug War” (2004): 4. http://www.icwa.org/ArticlesMap.asp?r=14
[29] Suzanne Ilchman, “Thousands Dead as a result of Thailand’s War on Drugs,” World Socialist, May 2003. http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/may2003/thai-m09.shtml
[30] Interview, Police Officer (anonymity requested) Amphur Muang, Chiang Rai, 8 August 2008. (Thai).
[31] Thaksin travelled the nation during the campaign proselytising his anti-drugs policy via the mediums of radio and television and public appearances. During these announcements Thaksin would discuss the progress of the campaign particularly regarding figures of those apprehended. There were also many national broadcasts discussing the drugs campaign. Examples of radio announcements have been archived on the Thai government website: http://www.thaigov.go.th/pageconfig/viewcontent/viewcontent1.asp?pageid=467&directory=1995&contents=3962&searchtxt= (Thai).
[32] Surin Pitsuwan, “The War on Drugs and Human Security,” The Nation, 3 March 2003.
[33] The Nation, 7 March 2003.
[34] A Chiang Rai Sub-District Chief stated that Thaksin’s popular village schemes and funds (1,000,000 baht to each village) ensured that critics of TRT policy were labelled as social deviants. The kamnan also noted that there very few Thaksin critics in his sub-district. Interview, Sub-District Chief (anonymity requested) Amphur Mae Jan, Chiang Rai, 10 August 2008. (Thai).
[35] Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, “The Thaksinization of Thailand” (NIAS: Copenhagen, 2005): 228.
[36] Ibid. 228.
[37] The Nation, 29 September 2003.
[38] Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, “The Thaksinization of Thailand” (NIAS: Copenhagen, 2005): 230.
[39] Jim Glassman, “The “War on Terrorism” Comes to Southeast Asia,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 35.1 (2005): 22.
[40] The Nation, 25 February 2003.
[41] Phujatgaan, 13 May 2003. (Thai). See also, The Nation, 20 December 2004.
[42] Khom Chat Luk, 31 October 2004. (Thai). Region 3 (North) News, 10 July 2003. (Thai). http://region3.prd.go.th/analyse/viewanalyse.php?view=10072546132203 See also, Khom Chat Luk, 17 December 2004. (Thai). The Nation, 5 March 2004 and Thai Post, 4 March 2004. (Thai).
